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Identifying Customary International Law
of War in Protocol I: A Proposed
Restatement
L. LYNN HOGUE*
"While I was [working as a hospital volunteer], I saw the Iraqi
soldiers come into the hospital with guns. They took the babies
out of the incubators, took the incubators and left the children to
die on the cold floor. It was horrifying."'
I. INTRODUCTION
Eyewitness accounts of Iraqi atrocities in the wake of the inva-
sion of Kuwait are sober reminders of the suffering caused by war and
the important role that the law of war should play in restraining mili-
tary excesses against noncombatants. Two important modifications to
the law of war-Protocols I and II Additional to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions2-promise to significantly affect United States opera-
tional law governing United States military operations overseas, 3 as
well as the conduct of the armed forces of other states. The protocols'
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1. Reports of Iraqi Atrocities in Kuwait: Hearing of the Congressional Human Rights
Caucus Comm., 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1990) (testimony of Nayirah (an alias)) [hereinafter
Iraqi Atrocities].
2. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), opened for signature
Dec. 12, 1977, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977) [hereinafter Protocol I]; Protocol Additional
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
Non-international Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, reprinted
in 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977) [hereinafter Protocol II].
3. For a definition of operational law ("OPLAW") see Graham, Operational Law-A
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impact is not, however, dependent on ratification by the United
States. Indeed, after review by the Departments of Defense and State,
President Reagan sought Senate ratification of Protocol II but not
Protocol I.4
Protocol II, when ratified, 5 will make important alterations in the
Geneva Conventions. 6 Protocol I will influence the law of war to the
extent that some of its provisions have, apart from any formal treaty
process, become part of customary international law.7 This Article
Concept Comes of Age, ARMY LAW., July 1987, at 9. See also Barnes, Operational Law, Spe-
cial Operations and Reserve Support, ARMY LAW., Dec. 1984, at 1.
OPLAW advisors must be familiar with both Protocols in order to properly advise com-
manders and assist them in carrying out their law of war responsibilities. "The operational law
judge advocate must ensure that all [Rules of Engagement] are consistent with domestic law,
as well as the law of war, and are sensible and easy to understand." Coleman, Operational Law
and Contingency Planning at XVIII Airborne Corps, ARMY LAW., Mar. 1988, at 19. See also
Meyer, Training the Army in Military Justice and the Law of War, ARMY LAW., Mar. 1984, at
5; Parks, Teaching the Law of War, ARMY LAW., June 1987, at 4.
4. MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING THE PRO-
TOCOL II ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF AUGUST 12, 1949, AND RELAT-
ING TO THE PROTECTION OF VICTIMS OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS,
CONCLUDED AT GENEVA ON JUNE 10, 1977, S. TREATY Doc. No. 2, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1987) [hereinafter Letter of Transmittal]; see also N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1987, § 1, at 1, col. 6.
5. On the status of a treaty between signing and submission, see M. WHITEMAN, 14
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 40-45 (1970).
6. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31
[hereinafter GWS]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded,
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217,
T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter GWS Sea]; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135
[hereinafter GPW]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GCC]
[GWS, GWS Sea, GPW, and GCC, collectively hereinafter The Geneva Conventions of Au-
gust 12, 1949].
7. The preamble to The Fourth Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs
of War on Land speaks of "the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations,
as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity
and from the dictates of the public conscience." The Fourth Hague Convention Respecting
the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.I.A.S. 539, reprinted in
I BEVANS, TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA, 1776-1949, 631, 633 (1970) [hereinafter 1907 Hague Convention]. This provi-
sion, also known as the Martens Clause, recognizes the existence of a customary international
law as a source of the law of war. See Meron, The Geneva Conventions As Customary Law, 81
AM. J. INT'L L. 348, 364-65 & n.52 (1987); Walker, The International Law Applicable to Guer-
rilla Movements in Internal Armed Conflicts: A Case Study of Contra Attacks on Nicaraguan
Farming Cooperatives, 21 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 147, 154-157 (1988). For a thorough
discussion of the origins of customary international law, see M. VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES 3-39 (1985) and Weisburd, Customary International Law.
The Problem of Treaties, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 39-41 (1988).
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examines the generally accepted portions of Protocol I and proffers a
suggested restatement of that law.8
The international community has been concerned with educating
both military personnel and civilians in the law of war. 9 A restate-
ment of the customary international law principles embodied within
Protocol I facilitates this educational process. Furthermore, the
emergence of regional low intensity conflicts10 as the prevailing mode
of modern warfare makes the careful analysis of the customary inter-
national law of Protocol I important, because Protocol I tends to blur
the Geneva Conventions' traditional distinctions between interna-
tional and internal conflicts. A restatement of the customary interna-
8. Two papers were helpful in identifying those provisions of Protocol I which have
become part of customary international law: W. Hays Parks, After Protocol I: A Military
View, 29 (unpublished manuscript) (reporting the conclusions of the United States Military
Law Working Group with respect to those "provisions of Protocol I [identifiable] as customary
law, or [supportable] for eventual incorporation into that law," and discussing those provisions
of Protocol I "supportable for inclusion in customary law through state practice"); Michael J.
Matheson, U.S. Position on the Relation of Customary International Law to the 1977 Addi-
tional Protocols presented at the Workshop on International Humanitarian Law, Washington
College of the Law, (Jan. 22, 1987) (identifying provisions of Protocol I as "principles [which]
should be observed and in due course recognized as customary law, even if they have not
already achieved that status").
The selection and restatement of the provisions of Protocol I which likely have the status
of customary international law is intentionally conservative and rejects many items from both
Parks' second list and Matheson's list. This restatement primarily employs Parks' first list, but
reflects the judgment and responsibility of the author alone. See Meron, supra note 7, at 350.
9. Protocol I, supra note 2, art. 82, at 1427 (legal advisors in the armed forces). More-
over, Protocol I article 83 states:
1. The High Contracting Parties undertake, in time of peace as in time of armed
conflict, to disseminate the Conventions and this Protocol as widely as possible in
their respective countries and, in particular, to include the study thereof in their
programmes of military instruction and to encourage the study thereof by the civilian
population, so that those instruments may become known to the armed forces and
the civilian population.
2. Any military or civilian authorities who, in time of armed conflict, assume re-
sponsibilities in respect of the application of the Conventions and this Protocol shall
be fully acquainted with the text thereof.
Id. art. 83, at 1427. See also GWS, supra note 6, art. 47; GWS Sea, supra note 6, art. 48.
While Protocol I, articles 82 and 83 are not themselves part of customary international
law, there is doubtless a requirement to disseminate through conventional military and civilian
educational programs accurate information about the content of so much of Protocol I (and in
the case of countries not ratifying Protocol II, its content as well) as is considered customary
international law.
10. M. KLARE & P. KORNBLUH, LOW-INTENSITY WARFARE: COUNTERINSURGENCY,
PROINSURGENCY, AND ANTITERRORISM IN THE EIGHTIES (1988); Barnes, Legitimacy and the
Lawyer in Low-Intensity Conflict (LIC): Civil Affairs Legal Support, ARMY LAW., Oct. 1988, at
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
tional law of Protocol I also offers the prospect of greater compliance
with the requirements of humanitarian law in low intensity conflicts.
In addition, some measure of restating Protocol I's provisions is
warranted on purely linguistic grounds. Protocol I is somewhat pro-
lix and opaque. While many of these language-based problems can be
traced to the conflation of initially unrelated texts,"1 poor draftsman-
ship also contributes to the confusion. 12
This Article will first analyze why the United States chose not to
ratify Protocol I. This Article will also summarize the substantive
provisions of Protocol II. Then, the Article will synthesize and re-
state in twelve normative propositions those provisions of Protocol I
which set forth customary international law. The Article will use ex-
amples from the recent Iraqi invasion of Kuwait to illustrate portions
of the restatement. As a part of this restatement process, this Article
also considers the degree to which Protocol I will be subsumed or
displaced upon the ratification of Protocol 11.13 The goal of this re-
statement is to promote greater awareness of this important part of
the law of war.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE NONRATIFICATION DECISION: A
UNITED STATES PERSPECTIVE
A diplomatic conference comprised of 124 states, 50 nongovern-
mental organizations, and 11 national liberation movements prepared
Protocols I and II while meeting in four sessions from 1974 to 1977.14
The protocols were intended to augment and supplement the 1949
Geneva Conventions. The United States chose to submit Protocol II
for ratification but not Protocol I. An analysis of Protocol I is helpful
11. E.g., Protocol II, supra note 2, art. 4, at 1444; see also M. BOTHE, K. PARTSCH, & W.
SOLF, NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 640-41 (1982) [hereinafter NEW
RULES].
12. E.g., Protocol II, supra note 2, arts. 2(2), 5(4), at 1443, 1445; see also NEW RULES,
supra note 11, at 631, 648 ("a barely readable text" and "strangely drafted").
13. The issues presented by joint operations between United States forces and states
which have ratified different protocols are not addressed in this Article. Such joint operations
problems must be resolved with reference to the full content of the law of war applicable to the
respective parties and the development of detailed operations plans to cover cases in which the
practices of the parties differ.
14. Murphy, Sanctions and Enforcement of the Humanitarian Law of the Four Geneva
Conventions of 1949 and Geneva Protocol I of 1977, 103 MIL L. REv. 3 (1984); NEW RULES,
supra note 11, at 1-10; DeSaussure, Symposium of the 1977 Geneva Protocols: Introduction, 19
AKRON L. REV. 521 (1986).
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in understanding the United States' position. This analysis will pro-
vide a much clearer perspective on the proposed restatement.
Protocol I strengthens the Geneva Conventions by: 1) extending
to civilian medical units the protections accorded to military medical
units; 15 2) clarifying the protections accorded medical transport, in-
cluding aircraft;' 6 3) increasing the responsibilities of parties to
search, report, and care for the missing and the remains of the dead; 17
4) providing expanded protection for civilians and civilian objects;' 8
and 5) insuring humane treatment for all persons.' 9 On the other
hand, Protocol I weakens the conventions by politicizing the law of
war. For example, certain types of irregulars, not previously covered
by the law of war because they do not distinguish themselves from
civilians or acknowledge their status as combatants, receive law of
war protections. 20 This represents a marked departure from tradi-
tional norms. 21
With United States participation, the diplomatic conference
drafted the protocols bearing in mind two objectives: "first, to obtain
better implementation of and compliance with existing international
law and, second, to develop new rules of law that are clear, are capa-
ble of being accepted by States, and are capable of being applied in
practice. ' 22 In reality, Protocol I falls short of both goals. Protocol I
neither fosters the application of existing international protections nor
is it consistently clear and capable of practical application.
President Reagan's Letter of Transmittal to the Senate recom-
mended that Protocol I not be ratified because it was "fundamentally
and irreconcilably flawed."' 23 President Reagan's rationale was that
Protocol I would: 1) politicize the law of war, legitimizing so-called
"wars of national liberation" and the national liberation movements
15. Protocol I, supra note 2, art. 22, at 1403.
16. Id. arts. 21-31, at 1403-07.
17. Id. arts. 32-34, at 1407-08.
18. Id. art. 54, at 1414.
19. Id. art. 75, at 1423.
20. Id. art. 44(3), at 1410-11. "[They must show that they are] commanded by a person
responsible for his subordinates; ... hav[e] a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
... [carry their] arms openly; ... [and conduct] their operations in accordance with the laws
and customs of war." GPW, supra note 6, art. 4(A)(2).
21. See GPW, supra note 6, art. 4(A)(2).
22. Remarks by G. Aldrich, United States Representative to the Geneva Diplomatic
Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Appli-
cable in Armed Conflicts (Mar. 5, 1974), quoted in Roberts, The New Rules for Waging War:
The Case Against Ratification ofAdditional Protocol 1, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 109, 122 n.78 (1985).
23. Letter of Transmittal, supra note 4, at iii.
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which fight in them; 2) "grant combatant status to irregular forces
even if they do not satisfy the traditional requirements to distinguish
themselves from the civilian population and otherwise comply with
the laws of war"; and 3) restrict or preclude previously lawful and
necessary military options through certain provisions. 24
Protocol I would have substantially altered some of the distinc-
tions inherent in the Geneva Conventions. For example, the Geneva
Conventions draw a sharp distinction between captives of interna-
tional conflicts and internal conflicts. Captured combatants in an in-
ternational conflict are treated as prisoners of war.25 In contrast,
captured combatants in an internal conflict can be treated as mere
criminals (e.g., tried for combat-related killing) with only the minimal
protections of fair trial assured by common article 3.26
Article 1 of Protocol I extends the coverage of the Geneva Con-
ventions' common article 2,27 to include "armed conflicts in which
peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation
and against racist regimes [("CARs")] in the exercise of their right of
self-determination. ' ' 28 The recognition of CARs conflicts as interna-
tional disputes extends Protocol I's protections to internal disputes
which fall short of belligerency. 29 This change injects into the law of
war an unprincipled, politicizing subjectivism, 30 which potentially af-
fords a claim for preferential treatment to criminals3' and terrorists.3 2
President Reagan expressed a concern not to "give recognition and
24. Id. at iii-iv.
25. The Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, supra note 6, common art. 2. The first
four articles of each of the four conventions are identical, and as such, are often referred to as
common articles.
26. Id. common art. 3.
27. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
28. Protocol I, supra note 2, art. 1(4), at 1397.
29. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL No. 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND
WARFARE, 11 (1956) [hereinafter FM 27-10]. A belligerency is a contention between two or
more states through their armed forces. See L. OPPENHEIM, 2 INTERNATIONAL LAW 201-06,
248-50 (Lauterpacht 7th ed. 1952).
30. Roberts, supra note 22, at 126-27.
31. United States v. Morales, 464 F. Supp. 325 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) is illustrative. William
Guillermo Morales, a criminal defendant in New York, was charged with the federal crime of
unlawful possession of firearms. Morales unsuccessfully argued that, as he was espousing the
cause of Puerto Rican independence, the court should declare him a prisoner of war under
Protocol I, article 1(4). Id. at 326.
32. Criticism of Protocol I's modification of the law of war to the advantage of terrorists
developed early. Feith, Law in the Service of Terror-The Strange Case of the Additional Proto-
col, NAT'L INTEREST, Fall 1985, at 36. For Feith's later views, see Feith, Protocol I: Moving
Humanitarian Law Backwards, 19 AKRON L. REV. 531 (1986). For extensive articles discuss-
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protection to terrorist groups" when rejecting Protocol 1. 33 Develop-
ing nations and national liberation movements that participated in the
diplomatic conference supported the CARs article, believing that it
would rectify perceived deficiencies. Groups fighting colonial pow-
ers-particularly African colonial powers-were concerned over the
denial of their belligerent status under common article 2 of the Ge-
neva Conventions.
In addition to the CARs conflict discussed above, Protocol I
posed other problems that contributed to the United States' decision
not to ratify. For example, under article 47, "a mercenary shall not
have the right to be a combatant or a prisoner of war."' 34 This provi-
sion violates both the letter and the spirit of the preamble, which pro-
vides that individuals who participate in war should not be
discriminated against on the basis of their motive for engaging in
combat. 35 Thus, this provision of Protocol I disserves the principle of
humanitarian treatment of prisoners of war. Furthermore, if the
United States ratified Protocol I, mercenaries would be deemed un-
lawful combatants under United States law by virtue of article 47.
According to the United States Supreme Court in Ex Parte Quirin,36
an unlawful combatant violates international law and may face sanc-
ing the theme that Protocol I abetted terrorism, see Roberts, supra note 22 and Sofaer, Terror-
ism and the Law, 64 FOREIGN AFF. 901 (1986).
Whether Protocol I fosters terrorists and terrorism is a disputed issue. See Aldrich,
Progressive Development of the Laws of War: A Reply to Criticisms of the 1977 Geneva Protocol
1, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 693, 700-01 n.32 (1986).
Roberts seems to agree with, if not be inspired by, a curious, passionate but unin-
formed attack on [Protocol I] made some months earlier by a Deputy Assistant of
Defense, Douglas Feith. [T]here are indications that its portrayal of the Protocol as
a 'pro-terrorist treaty' may have poisoned the atmosphere in official Washington-
one hopes only temporarily.
Id. See also Levie, Pros and Cons of the 1977 Protocol 1, 19 AKRON L. REV. 537, 541 (1986).
[W]hile it was extremely unfortunate that many of the provisions of [article 44] were
included in the Protocol, the writer does not share the fears of the Reagan Adminis-
tration that they will serve as a basis for the claim by terrorists that they come within
its provisions and that they are, therefore, entitled to prisoner-of-war status when
taken into custody.
Id.
33. "It is unfortunate that Protocol I must be rejected ... [but] we must not, and need
not give recognition and protection to terrorist groups as a price for progress in humanitarian
law." Letter of Transmittal, supra note 4, at iv; see also N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1987, § 1, col. 6.
34. Protocol I, supra note 2, art. 47, at 1412.
35. Id., preamble, at 1396.
36. 317 U.S. 1 (1942). German saboteurs illegally entered the United States during
World War II to destroy military installations. The Supreme Court held that their detention
and subsequent trial in the appropriate military tribunal was lawful. Id.
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.JV
tions under United States law.3 7 Currently, the United States deals
with mercenaries, if at all, under domestic laws, such as the Neutral-
ity Act. 38 However, such prosecutions are sporadic. 39 Furthermore,
at least one federal circuit court of appeals has held that mercenary
activity outside the United States does not violate United States law.40
Thus, ratification of Protocol I would have changed United States law
on this matter.41
Both the Hague and Geneva Conventions distinguish combatants
from noncombatants in order to advance the humanitarian protection
of noncombatants.42 Protocol I frustrates this objective by legitimiz-
ing circumstances in which combatants may conceal themselves as
civilians.43 This increases the chances of hostile attacks on civilians.
The text of Protocol I creates a broad exception to the traditional rule
distinguishing combatants from the rest of the civilian population:
In order to promote the protection of the civilian population from
the effects of hostilities, combatants are obliged to distinguish
themselves from the civilian population while they are engaged in
an attack or in a military operation preparatory to an attack. Rec-
ognizing, however, that there are situations in armed conflicts
where, owing to the nature of the hostilities an armed combatant
cannot so distinguish himself, he shall retain his status as a com-
batant, provided that, in such situations, he carries his arms
openly:
(a) during each military engagement, and
(b) during such time as he is visible to the adversary while he is
engaged in a military deployment preceding the launching of an
attack in which he is to participate.
Acts which comply with the requirements of this paragraph shall
37. Id. at 31.
38. 18 U.S.C. § 959(a) (1988) (enlistment within the United States in a foreign service).
See also id. § 956(a) (conspiracy to destroy the property of a foreign government); id. § 960
(planning expeditions against a friendly nation).
39. E.g., Gayon v. McCarthy, 252 U.S. 171 (1919) (expedition against Mexico); Wiborg
v. United States, 163 U.S. 632 (1896) (expedition against Cuba); see Cesner & Brant, Law of
the Mercenary: An International Dilemma, 6 CAP. U.L. REV. 339, 356 n.55, 356-57 (1977);
Note, Leashing the Dogs of War: Outlawing the Recruitment and Use of Mercenaries, 22 VA. J.
INT'L L. 589, 597 n.49 (1982) (noting a prosecution involving an expedition against
Dominica).
40. United States v. Dane, 570 F.2d 840 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 959
(1987).
41. See Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 760 (1988).
42. Protocol I, supra note 2, art. 43, at 1410; 1907 Hague Convention, supra note 7,
annex art. 3, at 644.
43. Protocol I, supra note 2, art. 44(3), at 1410-11.
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not be considered as perfidious within the meaning of Article 37,
paragraph l(c) [of Protocol I].44
This provision is a substantial disincentive for guerrillas and
other combatants to distinguish themselves from civilians. Thus, Pro-
tocol I reduces civilian protection because civilians will be suspected
of harboring concealed guerrillas or combatants in their midst. In an
effort to narrow the scope of this exception, the United States de-
clared at the time of Protocol I's signing that "military deployment
preceding the launching of an attack" in article 44(3)(b) means "any
movement towards a place from which an attack is to be launched. '45
However, even this interpretation is insufficient to deal with the prob-
lem of concealed combatants. 46
Nonetheless, Protocol I does articulate several traditional hu-
manitarian principles. Identifying customary international law in
Protocol I will ensure that its positive contributions to the law of war
will actually become the law of the United States and other nonratify-
ing countries without the counterproductive elements which led the
United States and other countries to reject ratification. Although
there are those who urge reconsideration of the Reagan administra-
tion's position on ratification of Protocol 1,47 this issue appears to be
conclusively resolved as a political matter. Thus, this restatement
enumerates only those elements of Protocol I which are binding on
nonratifying countries as customary international law. The following
summary of Protocol II will place the restatement in a better
perspective.
44. Id.
45. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, PAMPHLET No. 27-1-1, PROTOCOLS TO THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 138 (1979) [hereinafter DA PAM. 27-1-1].
46. Combatants in civilian dress in West Beirut following the deployment of Syrian
troops in February 1987 presented such a problem. The New York Times reported:
[G]unmen had slipped out of sight Sunday night shortly after Syrian Army units
began to deploy. But despite warnings from the chief of Syrian military intelligence,
Brig. Gen. Ghazi Kanaan, that gunmen would be shot on sight, some reappeared
today, wearing civilian clothes instead of their uniforms and trying to conceal their
weapons.
N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1987, § 1, at 1, col. 3.
47. Bagley, Ratification of Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 by the United
States: Discussion and Suggestions for the American Lawyer-Citizen, 11 Loy. L.A. INT'L &
COMP. L.J. 439 (1989).
1990]
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III. SUMMARY OF PROTOCOL 1148
Protocol II consists of four preambular clauses and twenty-eight
operative provisions, of which eighteen are substantive. 49 This section
summarizes only the substantive provisions.
Article 1 explains that Protocol II "develops and supplements"
common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and applies to non-
international or internal conflicts which
take place in the territory of a... [p]arty [to the Protocol] between
its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized
armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such
control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out
sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this
Protocol.5o
The protocol does not apply to internal disturbances which are not
armed conflicts "such as riots [and] isolated and sporadic acts of vio-
lence." 5' Thus, Protocol II recognizes the evolution of armed con-
flict. Article 1 in effect defines "a new form of non-international
conflict, with a threshold of application clearly above that of common
Article 3."52 No mechanism exists, however, to ascertain the capabil-
ity of rebel forces to implement the protocol or insure compliance
with its provisions.5 3
Article 2 extends Protocol II's protection to "all persons affected
by an armed conflict as defined in Article 1," whether they are "in the
area affected by the conflict or elsewhere. ' ' 54  This protection is be-
stowed without any "adverse distinction based . . . on race, colour,
sex, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national or
48. This summary draws upon but does not necessarily replicate the "Detailed Analysis"
of Protocol II included as an attachment to Letter of Transmittal, supra note 4, 1-7.
49. Protocol II, supra note 2, at 1442-43.
50. Id. art. l(l), at 1443.
51. Id. art. 1(2), at 1443.
52. NEW RULES, supra note 11, at 606.
53. Id. at 608.
It is... problematic that no attempt was made to insert a provision that the adverse
party, i.e. the rebels, should declare that they are bound to observe this Protocol, in
order to ensure that clear obligations from their side exist and cannot be questioned.
Under these circumstances, and in view of the near total absence of any provi-
sions on the implementation of Protocol II, one can only hope that the establishment
of a new standard for the protection of victims as such will have a certain effect, and
that the adverse party in such conflicts will itself be interested in enjoying the protec-
tion provided for in the Protocol and will therefore respect its provisions.
Id.
54. Id. at 630.
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social origin, wealth, . .. birth or other status" but not forbidding
adverse distinctions based on the "status of military or civilian, [or] of
combatant or non-combatant."5 5 In addition to these protections, all
who suffer a loss or restriction of liberty as a result of the conflict
receive the protections of articles 5 and 6 until their liberty is
restored. 56
Article 3 asserts that nothing in Protocol II is intended to affect
the sovereignty of the state although many military operations that
satisfy the threshold of article 1 do affect sovereignty. For example,
when an organized armed group controls part of a state's territory,
this type of conflict falls within Protocol II. This makes it difficult to
pursue the humanitarian objectives of Protocol II without confronting
the objection that state sovereignty has been impaired.57 Similarly,
the protocol cannot justify intervention, direct or indirect, "in the in-
ternal or external affairs of the . . . Party in [whose] territory . . .
conflict occurs. 58
Article 4 provides that nonparticipants in a conflict subject to the
protocol, including individuals who have ceased participation, are en-
titled to humane treatment without adverse distinctions whether or
not their liberty has been restricted.5 9 All individuals "are entitled to
respect for their person, honour and convictions and religious prac-
tices." 6° Article 4 forbids violence to life, health, and physical or
mental well-being.61 The article expressly bans murder and cruel
treatment (e.g., torture, mutilation, or corporal punishment), 62 as well
as any "order that there shall be no survivors. ' 63 Furthermore, col-
lective punishments, hostage-taking, acts of terrorism, outrages on
personal dignity (e.g., humiliating and degrading treatment, rape,
forced prostitution, and indecent assault), slavery and slave trade, pil-
lage, and threats to commit any of the foregoing acts are proscribed in
55. Id. at 630-31.
56. Id. at 631.
57. See id. at 607-08; compare Letter of Transmittal, supra note 4, at 6-7 ("[N]othing in
Protocol II affects the sovereignty . . . of any state . . . . The recognition of this point is
essential in persuading states to accept Protocol II and apply its provisions to conflicts within
their territory.") with discussion of Protocol II, art. 18 at infra text accompanying notes 125-
29.
58. NEw RULES, supra note 11, at 632.
59. Protocol II, supra note 2, art. 4, at 1444.
60. Id. art. 4(1), at 1444.
61. Id. art. 4(2)(a), at 1444.
62. Id.
63. Id. art. 4(1), at 1444.
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article 4.64 All such violence is "prohibited at any time and in any
place whatsoever. '65
These limitations present particular problems with respect to the
law of reprisal, which is expressly preserved in United States law.
66
Commentators suggest that the text of the article forecloses the option
of reprisal.67 However, this argument is inferred solely from the fact
that the drafters rejected several proposals dealing with reprisals. The
text of article 4 contains no express language dealing with reprisals, so
the argument for foreclosing reprisals is unpersuasive.
68
Article 4 also provides special protections for children, generally
defined as "persons under 15 years of age."' 69 Children must be pro-
vided with care, aid, and education. They cannot be recruited into
armed forces nor take part in hostilities. If they do take part in hostil-
ities and are captured, they nevertheless receive the special protection
provided by article 4, which is more protection than is required for
other prisoners of war. 70 Additionally, all appropriate steps must be
taken to reunite separated families, and when possible, to remove chil-
dren from areas of hostilities. 71
Article 5 extends protections to persons whose liberty has been
restricted by detention or internment arising out of armed conflict. 72
Article 5 significantly expands the traditional protections of the Ge-
neva Conventions, which did not previously apply to noninternational
armed conflict. 73 Article 5 specifically requires two types of protec-
tions for all armed conflicts whether intentional or not: minimal pro-
tections74 and protections "within the limits of [the] capabilities" of
64. Id. art. 4(2)(a)-(h), at 1444.
65. Id. art. 4(2), at 1444.
66. FM 27-10, supra note 29, 497.
67. NEw RULES, supra note 11, at 636-37.
68. Contra id. at 637. " '[T]he question of reprisals could not arise, since under the terms
of that Article, persons who did not take an active part or had ceased to take part in hostilities,
were in all circumstances to be treated humanely.' This argumentation is fully convincing."
Id.
69. Id. at 642 & n.5. See also Mann, International Law and the Child Soldier, 36 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 32 (1987).
70. Cf GPW, supra note 6, art. 38 ("[T]he Detaining Power shall encourage the practice
of intellectual, educational, and recreational pursuits.., and shall take the measures necessary
to ensure the exercise thereof by providing them with adequate premises and necessary
equipment.").
71. Cf GCC, supra note 6, art. 14 (safety zones for children and others in a Party's own
territory); id. art. 24 (reception into a neutral zone for the duration of the conflict).
72. Protocol II, supra note 2, art. 5, at 1444.
73. See, e.g., The Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, supra note 6, common art. 3.
74. Protocol II, supra note 2, art. 5(1), at 1444-45.
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the captor, detainer, or interner.75 Minimal protections require that
the wounded and sick be treated in accordance with article 7 of Proto-
col II, be allowed to receive individual and collective relief, be allowed
to practice their religion, and, if required to work, be subject to the
same working conditions as local civilians. Protections dependent on
the capabilities of the captor include spiritual assistance from clergy;76
separate quarters for women under the immediate supervision of wo-
men, unless families are accommodated together; 77 the right to send
and receive cards and letters (subject to a necessary numerical limit);
the right to be interned or detained away from the combat zone and
evacuated from such danger if it can be done safely; and the right to
medical examinations. 78 Article 5 strictly prohibits involuntary medi-
cal experimentation. 79
Other persons who are not captured or detained but whose "lib-
erty has been restricted in any way whatsoever for reasons related to
the armed conflict," shall be treated humanely in accordance with ar-
ticles 4 and 5.80 This extends medical care in accordance with article
7, as well as a right to receive individual and collective relief, practice
one's religion, and send and receive cards and letters. Beyond the
right to relief from third parties, however, there is no provision al-
lowing for necessary supplies of food and water to be brought into a
particular area.81 Finally, the release of captive or detained persons
should be conducted in a manner that assures their safety. 82
Article 6 defines substantive and procedural rules for penal pros-
ecutions relating to armed conflicts.8 3 National or rebel courts must
be impartial and convict only "on the basis of individual penal respon-
sibility."'84 The article further requires the following safeguards: 1)
prompt notice of the particular charge(s) against suspects and "all
75. Id. art. 5(2), at 1445.
76. "[Tihe right to receive spiritual assistance.., is only granted 'if requested and appro-
priate' and therefore belongs to the second category of protections provided for in paragraph
2." NEW RULES, supra note 11, at 646.
77. Some have argued that children should be separated under the same conditions as
women. See id. at 647.
78. See id.
79. Id. at 644.
80. See Protocol II, supra note 2, art. 5(l)(a), (c), (d) & (2)(b), at 1444-45.
81. NEW RULES, supra note 11, at 647.
82. See id. at 644.
83. Protocol II, supra note 2, art. 6, at 1445.
84. Id. An implicit assumption of article 6 is that the rebels will operate a court system
with enough sophistication to apply the requirements of the article. If they do not, then they
would doubtless fall short of the standards for application in article 1.
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necessary rights and means of defense"; 2) a presumption of inno-
cence; 3) the accused's presence at trial; and 4) freedom from com-
pelled self-incrimination.85 Conviction for an act which was not a
criminal offense when it was committed is prohibited, as is imposing a
heavier penalty than was in force when the criminal act was commit-
ted.86 An accused may benefit from the adoption of a lighter penalty
after the commission of the offense. 87 The accused must be advised of
any judicial or other remedies, as well as applicable time limits.8
Moreover, the death penalty shall not be applied to one under eight-
een years of age when the offense was committed nor "carried out on
pregnant women or mothers of young children."8 9 At the end of hos-
tilities, the authorities in power shall endeavor to grant the broadest
possible amnesty to persons who have participated in the armed con-
flict, whether they are interned or detained. 90
Article 7 provides for prompt and humane medical attention to
all wounded, sick, and shipwrecked persons.91 Any distinctions in
treatment must be based solely on medical grounds such as triage. 92
United States ratification of this article will render the corresponding
provision under customary international law superfluous. 93
Article 8 imposes a duty to search for wounded, sick, and ship-
wrecked persons "[w]henever circumstances permit" following an en-
gagement. 94 A comparison of the terms of this obligation for non-
international armed conflicts with the language of the GWS95 and the
GWS Sea96 which requires the search for wounded, sick, and ship-
wrecked persons "at all times, and particularly after an engagement
... and "after each engagement . . . without delay," discloses an
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. On article 6 generally, see NEw RULES, supra note 11, at 648-53.
91. Protocol 11, supra note 2, art. 7, at 1446.
92. Id.
93. See infra note 131 and accompanying text.
94. Protocol II, supra note 2, art. 8, at 1446.
95. GWS, supra note 6, art. 15. "At all times, and particularly after an engagement,
parties to the conflict shall ... take all possible measures to search for and collect the wounded
and sick . I. d. (emphasis added).
96. GWS Sea, supra note 6, art. 18. "After each engagement, parties to the conflict shall,
without delay, take all possible measures to search for and collect the shipwrecked, wounded
and sick . I..." d. (emphasis added). See NEw RULES, supra note 11, at 659.
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apparent intent to reduce protection for those who become wounded,
sick, or shipwrecked in non-international armed conflicts.
Article 9 mandates protection and respect for medical and reli-
gious personnel, assuring them all available aid in performing their
duties.97 Additionally, this article allows medical personnel to base
their decisions on medical need rather than non-medical preferences
imposed by armed forces. 98
Article 10 provides that no one shall be punished for rendering
medical assistance so long as it is "compatible with medical ethics." 99
Thus, medical personnel can give needed medical assistance to either
side in a conflict without fear of punishment.l°° This article is subject
to the reservation that "to the extent that [article 10] would affect the
internal administration of United States Armed Forces, including the
administration of military justice," it does not apply. 10 Persons en-
gaged in medical activities should follow the rules of medical ethics
and other rules in this protocol designed for the benefit of the
wounded and sick. They cannot be compelled to act in a contrary
manner. 10 2 Subject to domestic law, the professional rights and duties
of confidentiality of medical personnel shall be respected. Further-
more, medical personnel may not be penalized for refusing to disclose
information about their patients. 103
Article 11 provides that medical units and transports shall be
respected and protected, unless they are used to commit hostile
acts. 104 Even then, an attack on medical units may only proceed after
a warning followed by a reasonable time for response. 0 5
97. Protocol II, supra note 2, art. 9, at 1446.
98. This protection is a counterpart to Protocol II, article 7(2).
99. Protocol II, supra note 2, art. 10(l), at 1446.
100. This paragraph is a verbatim reiteration of Protocol I, article 16(1).
101. See Letter of Transmittal, supra note 4, at viii. The purpose of this reservation is to
avoid the defense of "medical ethics" by "military medical personnel... as an excuse to refuse
to perform their military duties or to disregard established treatment priorities and methods."
Smith, New Protections for Victims of International Armed Conflicts: The Proposed Ratification
of Protocol II by the United States, 120 MIL. L. REV. 59, 71 (1988).
102. Protocol II, supra note 2, art. 10(2), at 1446.
103. Because the provisions of paragraphs 3 and 4 are subject to national law, "[t]his
means that at the least the government in power is free to deviate from those obligations if the
necessary legal regulations exist. The obligations of the government are thus reduced to re-
specting the rule of law." NEW RULES, supra note 11, at 662.
104. Protocol II, supra note 2, art. 11, at 1446-47.
105. See NEW RULES, supra note 11, at 663-64. Paragraph 1 is a verbatim reiteration of
Protocol I, article 12, except for adding the words "and transports." Compare Protocol II,
supra note 2, art. 11(1), at 1446 with Protocol I, supra note 2, art. 12(1), at 1401.
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Article 12 requires the display of the red cross, red crescent, or
red lion and sun by medical and religious personnel, medical units,
and transports. 0 6 In addition, article 12 prohibits improper use or
disrespect for any of these symbols.107
Article 13 protects the civilian population from the dangers of
military operations by providing that neither the civilian population
nor individual civilians shall be made the object of attack. 0 8 Acts or
threats of violence which are primarily intended to spread terror
among the civilian population are also prohibited. 0 9 United States
ratification of this article will render the corresponding provision
under customary international law superfluous." 0
Article 14 prohibits starvation of civilians as a method of com-
bat."' The article also prohibits attacking, destroying or otherwise
removing or rendering useless "objects indispensable to the survival of
the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the
production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations
and supplies and irrigation works."" 2
Article 15 provides protection against attacks on dams, dikes,
and nuclear power generating stations." 3 This protection extends
even to military objectives "if such attack may cause the release of
dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian pop-
ulation." 114 There are targeting problems under the novel strictures
of article 15. Dams, dikes, and nuclear power generating stations are
protected even if they are lawful targets as military objectives, but
only if severe civilian casualties would result from an attack. Thus,
[c]ommanders and targeting staffs would not only have to decide
whether severe losses might occur in a particular area, they must
also weigh whether any 'doubt' exists as to whether the persons
affected are civilians. (Aerial photographs might show, for exam-
ple, that flooding caused by a dam attack would wipe out a system
of roads heavily used by military trucks carrying military supplies;
106. Protocol II, supra note 2, art. 12, at 1447.
107. Id.; see NEW RULES, supra note 11, at 665.
108. Protocol II, supra note 2, art. 13, at 1447.
109. Id.
110. See NEW RULES, supra note 11, at 676-79.
111. Protocol II, supra note 2, art. 14, at 1447.
112. Id.; see NEw RULES, supra note 11, at 680-82.
113. Protocol II, supra note 2, art. 15, at 1447. The article uses the phrase "[w]orks or
installations containing dangerous forces." Id.
114. Id. Article 15 is a verbatim reiteration of the first sentences of Protocol I, article
56(l).
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they would be unlikely to show whether the drivers, who might
suffer severe losses from drowning, are civilian or military.)' 15
Article 15, in effect, provides a gloss on the rules of proportionality,
necessity, and the avoidance of unnecessary suffering that usually
guide the operational law advisor in targeting situations. 1 6
Article 16 prohibits any acts of hostility directed against historic
monuments, works of art, and places of worship which constitute the
cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples." 7  The article also bars their
use in support of a military effort. 118 The United States has an under-
standing that article 16 establishes a special protection for a limited
class of objects that, "because of their recognized importance, consti-
tute a part of the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples, and that
such objects will lose their protection if they are used in support of the
military effort."'' 19 The provisions of article 16 are expressly made
"[w]ithout prejudice to the provisions of the Hague Convention for
the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict of
May 14, 1954."120
That convention by its terms relieves a party from compliance in
cases "where military necessity requires such a waiver."' 2' Without
an understanding, the United States-which has signed but not rati-
fied the Hague Convention of 1954-would not be able to disregard
article 16 in cases of military necessity. Commentators have sug-
gested that the understanding by the United States grants it broader
power to disregard the provisions of article 16 in cases of military
necessity than are available under the Hague Convention of 1954.122
115. Carnahan, Additional Protocol I: A Military View, 19 AKRON L. REV. 543, 547
(1986).
116. "[T]he judge advocate may advise and assist the [Corps Targeting B]oard by provid-
ing general targeting guidance consistent with the requirements of the Hague and Geneva
Conventions, reviewing pertinent [Rules of Engagement] for conformity with domestic and
international law .... " Coleman, Operational Law and Contingency Planning at XVIII Air-
borne Corps, ARMY LAW., Mar. 1988, at 20. See also NEW RULES, supra note 11, at 683-85.
117. Protocol II, supra note 2, art. 16, at 1447.
118. Id.
119. Letter of Transmittal, supra note 4, at viii. In his Letter of Transmittal, the President
recommended that the United States ratify Protocol II subject to certain conditions or "under-
standings." Id.
120. Protocol II, supra note 2, art. 16, at 1447.
121. Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict of May 14, 1954, art. 4(2), 249 U.N.T.S. 215, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED
CONFLICT 657 (D. Schindler & J. Toman ed. 1981).
122. See Smith, New Protections for Victims of International Armed Conflicts: The Pro-
posed Ratification of Protocol II by the United States, 120 MIL. L. REV. 59, 72-75 (1988):
The understanding ... is not consistent with the Hague Convention of 1954 or the
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Article 17 limits combat-related displacement of the civilian pop-
ulation to instances in which civilian safety requires displacement or
where "imperative military reasons so demand."1 23 Displacements
must include the assurance of satisfactory shelter, hygiene, health,
safety, and nutrition at the receiving site. Civilians cannot be dis-
placed from their own territory even for reasons connected with the
conflict. 124
Article 18 provides that relief societies located in the territory of
a conflict may offer to perform traditional functions and services to
the victims of armed conflict. 125 An offer of medical assistance, food,
shelter, family reunion assistance, and victim information should be
given sympathetic consideration. The armed force in control, how-
ever, is not obligated to accept the offer.1 26 Similarly, civilians may
also offer to collect and care for the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked,
but a party need not accept the offer.' 27 Since, however, parties do
have an obligation under both common article 3 of the Geneva Con-
ventions and article 7 of Protocol II to collect and care for the
wounded and sick, there would be an obligation to accept offers of
relief unless the armed forces assumed responsibility.
Impartial, exclusively humanitarian relief, such as providing
food and medical supplies essential for survival, may be undertaken
on behalf of civilian victims. Such relief is to be administered without
adverse distinctions such as nationality, but is "subject to the consent
of the High Contracting Party concerned."'' 28 As a practical matter,
drafting history of Article 16. The understanding draws upon two of the Hague
Conventions of 1907, which are binding on all nations during international armed
conflict as customary international law. The Hague Convention of 1954, however,
increased the protection afforded cultural property by permitting waiver only in cases
of imperative necessity. If cultural objects are used in support of the military effort,
this violates the Hague Convention of 1954, but does not necessarily justify attacking
them. The proposed understanding is therefore consistent with customary interna-
tional law, but is broader than permitted under the Hague Convention of 1954.
... If the United States reserved the right to waive the protections of Article 16
to the same extent as provided in the Hague Convention, this reservation would be
consistent with the intended application of Article 16. The proposed waiver provi-
sion, however, is broader than that allowed under the Hague Convention of 1954.
For this reason, the recommended 'understanding' to Article 16 must be understood
as a reservation that changes the obligations under the Article.
Id. at 74-75 (citations omitted); see also NEW RULES, supra note 11, at 686-89.
123. Protocol II, supra note 2, art. 17, at 1447.
124. Id.; see NEw RULES, supra note 11, at 690-93.
125. Protocol II, supra note 2, art. 18, at 1447-48.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. art. 18(2), at 1448.
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relief is subject to the approval of those granting and receiving relief
and those permitting transit of the relief aid. The established govern-
ment's consent is not required in areas where the affected territory
and civilian victims are under rebel control. Those in actual or effec-
tive control may consent to the relief without any special
formalities. 129
In short, Protocol II extends the traditional norms of war to a
broader class of armed conflicts. While certain practical shortcom-
ings remain, the goal of providing protections to more people is im-
portant given the prevalence of armed conflict throughout the world.
Moreover, Protocol II does incorporate some of the protections con-
tained in Protocol I, which the president did not submit to the Senate
for ratification. 130
IV. A RESTATEMENT OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
LAW IN PROTOCOL I
Protocol I reflects certain core principles which have long been
respected in the law of war: the avoidance of unnecessary suffering,
proportionality, and military necessity. States have acknowledged
these principles through their involvement in the process that resulted
in the draft of Protocol I under the sponsorship of the International
Committee of the Red Cross. Twelve norms of customary interna-
tional law reflective of these principles can be identified in Protocol I.
These norms are restated below. Also noted is the extent to which
these norms are replicated in Protocol II.
A. Humane Medical Attention
All wounded, sick, and shipwrecked persons must be given
prompt and humane medical attention with distinctions in care based
solely on medical grounds such as triage. This principle is contained
in article 10.131 A state's ratification of Protocol II will subsume this
129. See NEW RULES, supra note 11, at 694-97.
130. See supra text accompanying note 4.
131. Protocol I, supra note 2, art. 10, at 1400. This article corresponds to GWS supra note
6, art. 12 and GWS Sea supra note 6, art. 12. It augments those requirements by requiring
protection and care for civilians. "It is... forbidden to treat one's own wounded first, or to
give priority to soldiers over civilians. The one whose treatment is most urgent for medical
reasons must be treated first." NEW RULES, supra note 11, at 108. Although article 10 of
Protocol I speaks of "[a]ll the wounded, sick and shipwrecked, to whichever Party they belong
.... " the scope of the obligation created by customary international law doubtless extends to
all those injured as a result of their presence in a conflict, even those not technically belonging
to a party to the conflict. For example, war correspondents who have not received the authori-
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provision. 32
Iraq's recent invasion of Kuwait provides an example of a viola-
tion of this norm. According to one eyewitness account, Iraqi soldiers
entered a hospital's Intensive Care Unit where they removed tubes
and equipment from heart patients. 133 The patients subsequently
died. ' 34
B. Respect for Medical Units
Medical units and personnel shall be respected and protected.
Such units should not be the object of attack nor should they be used
to shield military objectives from attack or to acquire military advan-
tage. Furthermore, medical units should not be in a location that will
imperil their safety. Several articles within Protocol I address this
concept. 135 Medical units, transports, and personnel that claim pro-
tection shall be identified by a distinctive emblem.' 36 Thus, ambu-
lances, vehicles transporting medical personnel or equipment, and
medical air or sea craft receive special protection.
C. Disabled Aircraft
Troops descending by parachute from disabled aircraft may not
be fired upon, 37 at least until they are given an opportunity to surren-
der. Airborne troops or others on hostile missions may be fired
upon. 38 This distinction furthers the principle of protecting non-
zation described in GPW article 4(A)(4) ("authorization from the armed forces which they
accompany") do not waive their right to protection. Accord, Protocol II, supra note 2, art. 7,
at 1446.
132. See Protocol IH, supra note 2, art. 7, at 1446.
133. Iraqi Atrocities, supra note 1, at 18.
134. Id.
135. See, e.g., Protocol I, supra note 2, arts. 12(1) & (4), 15(1), 21, 24, 28(1) at 1401, 1402,
1403, 1404, 1405. Article 12 corresponds to GWS, supra note 6, art. 19. Protection is ex-
tended "to both civilian and military medical units," NEW RULES supra note 11, at 118, in-
cluding ambulances and similar medical vehicles, id. at 142-43, and personnel, id. at 125.
136. Protocol I, supra note 2, art. 18(1), (2), (4), (7), at 1403. Provision for a distinctive
emblem for medical units, transports, and personnel is made in GWS, supra note 6, arts. 38-44
and GWS Sea, supra note 6, arts. 41-43. See NEW RULES supra note 11, at 135.
137. Protocol I, article 42 virtually adopts the language of FM 27-10, 30, which is the
basis for this restatement:
The law of war does not prohibit firing upon paratroops or other persons who are or
appear to be bound upon hostile missions while such persons are descending by para-
chute. Persons other than those mentioned in the preceding sentence who are de-
scending by parachute from disabled aircraft may not be fired upon.
FM 27-10, supra note 29, 30.
138. Protocol I, supra note 2, art. 42, at 1410; see also NEW RULES, supra note 11, at 226-
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combatants. Troops whose equipment have become disabled are pre-
sumed to have lost combatant status, but must still be treated as
prisoners of war.
D. Humane Treatment of Prisoners
Persons taking part in hostilities, but who are not entitled to pris-
oner-of-war status or more favorable treatment under the Geneva
Convention on Civilians, are entitled to the guarantees of humane
treatment. 139 The purpose of this provision is to provide at least mini-
mum protections for prisoners. A state's ratification of Protocol II
will subsume this provision.' 4°
E Protection of Civilians from Attack
Neither the civilian population nor individual civilians shall be
made the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence with the pri-
mary purpose of spreading terror among the civilian population are
prohibited.' 4' This provision will be subsumed upon ratification of
Protocol 11. 142
The Iraqi army repeatedly violated this principle in Kuwait, as
amply illustrated by the following chilling testimony:
While at the market, trying to buy food for my family, I saw
two Kuwaiti young boys, 15 or 16 years old, in handcuffs, escorted
by Iraqi soldiers. And the soldiers knocked on the door and a
child answered. They asked her to call her mother or father. And
when the woman came out, they asked her ... if she knew these
two boys. She said, "Yes, they are my sons." Then the soldiers
asked her to come out and to call all family members out of the
house. . . . And in full view of the mother, sister and young
brother, and as well as around 50 men and women in the market-
139. Protocol I, art. 45(3), at 1411.
140. Protocol II, supra note 2, arts. 4-6, at 1444-46. Article 45(3) includes a cross refer-
ence to the protection of article 75 of Protocol I. As detailed in NEW RULES, supra note 11, at
456-66, the provisions of Protocol I, article 75 were drawn from Protocol II, articles 4-6, but
differ in some respects. In view of the decision of the United States to ratify Protocol II, the
sole measure of obligation in this respect is assumed to be that of Protocol II, articles 4-6.
Accordingly, no restatement of Protocol I, article 75 is attempted.
141. Protocol I, supra note 2, art. 51(2), at 1413. FM 27-10, supra note 29, at 25 states
that "it is a generally recognized rule of international law that civilians must not be made the
object of attack directed exclusively against them." However, "[a]s a practical matter, some
fear and terror will be suffered by civilians whenever military objectives in their vicinity are
attacked." NEW RULES, supra note 11, at 300-01.
142. See Protocol II, supra note 2, art. 13, at 1447.
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place, they shot and killed the two boys. 14 3
F. Proper Objects of Attack
Only military objectives constitute lawful targets for attack.'l
Military objectives are those objects which by their nature, location,
purpose, or use effectively contribute to military action. Additionally,
any object whose partial or total destruction, capture, or neutraliza-
tion offers a military advantage must be considered a military objec-
tive. '45 The Iraqi army reportedly fired on Kuwaiti homes from their
tanks-a clear violation of this norm, assuming no hostile activity was
associated with those houses. 14 6
G. Advance Warning of Attacks
Precautions shall be taken in the conduct of military operations
to spare the civilian population, civilians, and civilian objects. 147
While some attacks on population centers may be inevitable, military
commanders must still exercise restraint. Effective advance warning
of attacks affecting the civilian population shall be given unless pre-
vented by unforeseen circumstances. 48
H. Treatment of Undefended Localities
Undefended localities may not be attacked. 49 Appropriate au-
thorities may declare any inhabited place in or near an area where
armed forces are in contact to be open for occupation by opposing
forces under the following conditions: 1) all combatants, mobile weap-
ons, and mobile military equipment have been evacuated; 2) the forces
do not make hostile use of fixed military installations or equipment; 3)
neither the authorities nor the population commit any hostile acts;
and 4) the forces do not undertake any activities in support of military
operations. 50 Using police forces solely to maintain law and order or
143. Iraqi Atrocities, supra note 1, at 21 (testimony of Abdullah (an alias)).
144. Protocol I, supra note 2, art. 52(1), (2), at 1414.
145. Id.; see NEW RULES, supra note 11, at 320-25; see also FM 27-10, supra note 29,
56, 58 (limiting the scope of permissible devastation to the strict necessities of war).
146. Iraqi Atrocities, supra note 1, at 24.
147. Protocol I, supra note 2, art. 57(1), (2)(c), at 1415-16.
148. Id. art. 57(2)(c), at 1416. The 1907 Hague Convention annex article 26 provides:
"The officer in command of an attacking force must, before commencing a bombardment,
except in cases of assault, do all in his power to warn the authorities." 1907 Hague Conven-
tion, supra note 7, annex art. 26, at 648; see also NEw RULES, supra note 11, at 368.
149. Protocol I, supra note 2, art. 59, at 1416-17.
150. Id. art. 59(2), at 1416-17.
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to aid persons protected under the Geneva Conventions-those who
are wounded and sick and medical or religious personnel-does not
violate the conditions for declaring an inhabited place open for occu-
pation. A declaration that an inhabited place is open for occupation
must reach the attacking force. The declaration shall include precise
demarcations of the inhabited place for which protection is sought.
In the event that these conditions are not met, or the attacking force
does not recognize the place as open, the locality nevertheless contin-
ues to enjoy the protection of all other rules of international law appli-
cable to armed conflicts.15'
L Demilitarized Zones
As a means of protecting civilians who take no part in hostilities
and perform no work of a military character, as well as wounded and
sick combatants or noncombatants,' 52 parties to a conflict may agree
to establish demilitarized zones. The requirements for a demilitarized
zone include:
(a) all combatants, as well as mobile weapons and mobile military
equipment must have been evacuated; (b) no hostile use shall be
made of fixed military installations or establishments; (c) no acts of
hostility shall be committed by the authorities or by the popula-
tion; and (d) any activity linked to the military effort must have
ceased. 153
Once established by agreement, a party may not extend its mili-
tary operations or activities into the zone. 154 Violations of such agree-
ments deprive the zone of its demilitarized status but do not obviate
the protections of other rules of international law applicable in armed
conflict. 155
151. "The attack or bombardment, by whatever means, of towns, villages, dwellings, or
buildings which are undefended is prohibited." 1907 Hague Convention, supra note 7, annex
art. 25, at 648; see also NEw RULES, supra note 11, at 380-85.
152. Protocol I, supra note 2, arts. 10, 51, at 1400, 1413-14.
153. Id. art. 60(3), at 1417.
154. Id. art. 60(l), at 1417.
155. Cf GCC, supra note 6, art. 15 (a more limited provision stating that "[a]ny Party to
the conflict may ... propose to the adverse Party to establish, in the regions where fighting is
taking place, neutralized zones intended to shelter from the effects of war ... wounded and
sick combatants or non-combatants [and] civilian persons who take no part in hostilities, and
who, while they reside in the zones, perform no work of a military character."). An innovative
neutral zone at sea was established without any special written agreement during the Falkland-
Malvinas Islands conflict in 1982. "This zone, called the Red Cross Box with a diameter of
approximately twenty nautical miles apparently worked well." S. JUNOD, PROTECTION OF
THE VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICT FALKLAND-MALVINAS ISLANDS 26 (1984). For a dis-
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J. Protection for Stateless People
Stateless people who were stateless or refugees before the out-
break of hostilities are protected persons. This protection is consis-
tent with traditional norms such as the Geneva Convention on
Civilians. 1 56
K. Special Protections for Women
Women are to be given special protection against rape, forced
prostitution, and other forms of indecent assault.157 These special
protections are in addition to other protections which all civilians en-
joy. Iraqi soldiers ignored this norm, engaging in widespread sexual
violence against Kuwaiti women. 158
L. Special Protections for Children
Children are also entitled to special protections. Children are to
be given the necessary care and aid appropriate for their age and con-
dition. Children must additionally be protected against any form of
indecent assault.1 59 The Iraqi soldiers in Kuwait reportedly have a
practice of killing all male children. 16°
These twelve principles from Protocol I represent significant
clarifications of traditional law of war prescriptions. Customary in-
ternational law will subsume some remaining provisions of Protocol I.
Other portions of Protocol I which contain textual defects, such as
vagueness or generality, are not likely to be added to the law of war
and therefore have not been considered in this restatement. In addi-
tion, provisions such as articles 35 and 40, which merely restate ex-
isting law of war, have not been considered. 161
cussion of the international zone of refuge established by the Council of the Organization of
American States in Santo Domingo in 1965, see M. WHITEMAN, 10 DIGEST OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 440-41 (1968).
156. Protocol I, supra note 2, art. 73, at 1423. This article is a reaffirmation of existing law
clearly implicit from the terms of the Geneva Convention on Civilians, article 4. NEW RULES,
supra note 11, at 448. For a discussion of the background and effect of this provision, see id. at
446-50.
157. Protocol I, supra note 2, art. 76, at 1425; accord GCC, supra note 6, art. 27; see NEW
RULES, supra note 11, at 468-70.
158. See, e.g., Iraqi Atrocities, supra note 1, at 20 (testimony of Ms. Ruth AI-Qallaf).
159. Protocol I, supra note 2, art. 77(l), at 1425; see NEW RULES, supra note 11, at 474-
76.
160. Iraqi Atrocities, supra note 1, at 20 (testimony of Ms. Ruth Al-Qallaf).
161. See NEW RULES, supra note 11, at 193, 216-18.
[Vol. 13:279
1990] Law of War Restatement 303
V. CONCLUSION
Protocol I contained serious deficiencies leading numerous coun-
tries, including the United States, to reject the final document. Por-
tions of Protocol I are nevertheless applicable to these countries
because they are part of customary international law. In addition,
Protocol II in certain respects subsumes Protocol I.
This Article restates those normative provisions of Protocol I
which are fairly incorporated into customary international law.
Hopefully, this restatement will promote greater awareness of both
the traditional norms contained within the law of war and the at-
tempts to expand those norms as represented by Protocols I and II.
The dissemination of these normative principles is of the utmost im-
portance, given the proliferation of nontraditional armed conflicts
throughout the world today.

